

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

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CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1975

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:07 a.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order.

In July 1973 the Foreign Ministers of 33 European countries and the United States opened the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in Helsinki. Since then the participants have made slow but steady progress on a broad range of security, political, economic and other issues of mutual concern.

As the conference reaches what appears to be a conclusive stage interest in its eventual outcome has mounted both in Congress and throughout the Nation. Special concern has been expressed over the implications the Conference may have for such issues as human rights in Eastern Europe, the division of Germany, U.S. force levels in Europe, and the future of the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

To discuss with us these and other issues we are pleased to welcome to the International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee, Hon. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Mr. Hartman is accompanied by Mr. Robert Frowick, Chief of the Political Section, Office of NATO and European Regional Political Military Affairs, and Mr. Harold Russell, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State.

Mr. Hartman, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARTHUR A. HARTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Arthur A. Hartman of New Jersey, before becoming Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister Counselor, U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels since 1972. From 1967 to 1972 he served in the Department of State as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Staff Director of the Senior Inter-Departmental Group (1967-69) and from 1969-72 as Deputy Director for Coordination.

He was born on March 12, 1926, in New York, N.Y. Mr. Hartman received his A.B. degree from Harvard University in 1944 and attended Harvard Law School during 1947-48. He served in the U.S. Army from 1944 to 1946. He entered Government service in 1948 and was assigned as Economic Officer, Economic Cooperation Administration, Paris. In 1952 he was Economic Officer, U.S. Delegation to European Army Conference, Paris, and in 1954 he was a Politico-Military Officer, U.S. Mission to NATO in the European Regional Organization, Paris.

From 1956 to 1958 he was Economic Officer in Saigon. From 1958 to 1961 Mr. Hartman was an International Affairs Officer, Economic Organization Affairs Section, Bureau of European Affairs. During 1961-62 he was Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and during 1962-63 Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State. From 1963 to 1967 he was Chief of the Economic Section in London. Mr. Hartman received the Presidential Management Improvement Award in 1970 and the Distinguished Honor Award in 1971.

Mr. HARTMAN. Thank you very much.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a short statement which would put into the record where things stand.

The substantive phase of negotiations in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—the so-called stage II of this Conference—has entered the final weeks of bargaining. Differences remain on some particularly sensitive questions relating to limited military security proposals—or “confidence-building measures”—and the freer movement of people, ideas, and information. However, with a sufficient display of flexibility by all of the 35 participant states in this Conference, it may be possible to conclude the Geneva negotiations by late spring or summer. The way will then be open for convening the stage III final meeting of CSCE in Helsinki, depending on negotiating results at Geneva, though we and our allies have made no final commitments to conclude this conference at the summit level.

CSCE IN PERSPECTIVE

CSCE should be seen in perspective as but one aspect of our continuing efforts to move from confrontation to negotiation in strengthening East-West relations in Europe. The Soviet Union first proposed a European security conference in 1954 and periodically reiterated the proposal over subsequent years, but the Western and neutral nations showed little enthusiasm for it. It appeared that Moscow's principal objective was to exploit such an event as a quasi-peace conference to produce a surrogate World War II peace treaty. In 1969, however, as nations of both East and West began to take increased bilateral initiatives toward détente, a renewed Warsaw Pact appeal for a European security conference elicited a cautiously positive reaction by the NATO allies, who took the position that such a conference might serve a useful purpose after concrete progress had been achieved on the most sensitive aspect of East-West confrontation; namely, Berlin.

THE BERLIN PRECONDITION

We and our allies specified in successive NATO documents, beginning in late 1969, that conclusion of a new Four Power agreement on Berlin, aimed at effecting practical improvements in relations between the people on both sides of the wall and between Bonn and West Berlin, could lead to allied willingness to participate in a

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Berlin accord, signed September 3, 1971, took effect in June 1972. The CSCE multilateral preparatory talks thereupon opened at Helsinki the following November, and it is noteworthy that Warsaw Pact countries agreed to commence exploratory talks on mutual and balanced-force reductions (MBFR) at Vienna shortly thereafter in January 1973.

WESTERN PRIORITIES

At CSCE, the emphasis of the Western and neutral participant states has been on improving, not freezing, the status quo in Europe. For our part, we have approached this Conference on the premise that if détente is to endure, all sides must benefit. At the same time, we have sought to guarantee that in our efforts to build a new relationship with the Soviet Union, there would be no devaluation of our traditional alliance relationships. We have sought to encourage realism by all participants with respect to what can and cannot be achieved in changing human conditions in the East. And finally, we have emphasized that the emergence of more normal relations with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain our national defense.

STATUS OF CSCE RESULTS

Conference participants view the emerging CSCE documents as statements of political resolve or declarations of intent, not agreements legally binding upon governments. The Conference will not produce a treaty. Rather, its final documents will resemble the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the U.N. Friendly Relations Declaration, neither of which required the advice and consent of the Senate. Any more formal treatment would, indeed, be criticized by other Western participants as inconsistent with their understanding of the nature of this Conference and would play into the hands of those who have sought to portray the results of this Conference as tantamount to a World War II peace treaty. We remain loyal to the letter and spirit of the Potsdam agreement of 1945, which states explicitly that the political and territorial problems affecting Germany since World War II must be resolved in a formal peace treaty.

While we do not anticipate that CSCE will produce any legally binding texts, it is clear that they will be seen as having important political commitments behind them, since they will be signed by high-level representatives of 35 nations.

THE CSCE AGENDA

The CSCE agenda includes four major items, known as "baskets," concerning respectively: Political and security questions; economic, scientific, and technological cooperation; cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations; and post-CSCE followup arrangements.

BASKET 1

Under the first agenda item, Conference negotiators are working on a declaration of 10 principles of interstate relations. Nine of those principles are now provisionally registered.

Sovereign equality; that is, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Inviolability of frontiers;

Territorial integrity of states;

Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Nonintervention in internal affairs;

Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; and

Cooperation among states.

The 10th principle deals with fulfillment of obligations.

The Soviets have been especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers. Western participants have made clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would in no sense constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present borders are immutable. And the Federal Republic of Germany, with the support of its NATO allies, has insisted on a reference to the possibility of "peaceful border changes." The United States has taken an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful change.

We and our allies also attach special importance to the principles concerned with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, peaceful settlement of disputes, self-determination and nonintervention in others affairs.

With respect to human rights, we and our allies are working to insure that the CSCE results will supplement and add to, and not attenuate in any way, existing internationally accepted documents in this field. The seventh principle, dealing with human rights, is the longest and most detailed principle and is a remarkably strong reaffirmation of human rights considering the character of the participating states and the circumstances under which the principle was negotiated. It states specifically that the CSCE participants will act in conformity with the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights rather than simply respect them as a statement of goals. This principle is further supplemented and given practical effect by various texts under agenda item 3.

We have been aware that a great many American citizens of Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian ethnic backgrounds have expressed concern that somehow CSCE results might represent a reversal of the long-standing U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the 1940 incorporation of the Baltic states in the U.S.S.R. We have repeatedly indicated in official correspondence with members of both Houses of Congress in recent weeks that the CSCE results will in no way alter the existing U.S. position on the Baltic question.

Under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have also discussed some limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. While differences continue to separate East and West in this area, there are signs of flexibility that hopefully will make it possible to reach agreement on two modest but significant "confidence-building measures": prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers. An agreed text has already been registered on the latter topic.

BASKET 2

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks have made progress on a series of draft declarations or resolutions concerned with economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. If the CSCE understandings on these topics are implemented, they should help broaden East-West industrial cooperation, reduce barriers to trade, and increase scientific exchanges and cooperation on the environment. The U.S. delegation at the CSCE has sponsored a proposal on arbitration of East-West commercial disputes and has cosponsored proposals for expansion of business contacts and enhanced scientific and technological cooperation.

BASKET 3

The third agenda item—the well-known “basket 3” of the Conference—deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational contacts. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our allies, and the neutral states. Here we are negotiating especially sensitive issues for both East and West, partly because the subject deals with “ideological coexistence,” which has always been an anathema to Moscow. At Geneva, provisional agreement has already been reached on numerous key texts relating, for example, to family reunification, family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, tourism, access to information, and stepped-up cultural and educational cooperation. Difficult negotiations continue on texts designed to provide greater opportunities for travel, improved working conditions for journalists, and some other issues.

BASKET 4

Under the fourth agenda item, the CSCE negotiations will consider “followup” arrangements. The debate here has turned upon whether these activities should be institutionalized or essentially ad hoc. The Warsaw Pact countries continue to support a Czechoslovakian proposal for creation of a “consultative committee” with a permanent secretariat to carry forward the East-West dialog on all issues under discussion at CSCE meetings as well as prepare further high-level conferences. On behalf of the European Community, Denmark has tabled a proposal, endorsed by the United States, calling for a post-CSCE probationary period until 1977 when a meeting of senior officials would review implementation of all CSCE decisions and consider whether additional followup activities would serve a useful purpose. Meanwhile, neutral states have begun informally to put forward suggestions for a compromise. In general, negotiations on followup have not progressed very far since the Allies have insisted that they begin in earnest only after the final results of the stage II negotiations begin to come more clearly into view.

POSSIBILITY OF SUMMIT-LEVEL CONCLUSION

Our allies believe that if the final results of the Geneva negotiations prove satisfactory, a summit-level conclusion would be justified.

We have taken much the same view and believe it would be unwise for the United States to decline to participate at the same level as our Western European partners. In fact, participation at some lower level might be seen as implying that we are losing interest in European affairs when we should now be emphasizing the contrary.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize one further point: That this is a conference of 35 states and participating entities, including Monaco, I believe, and the Vatican, and the Conference operates on the basis of consensus; that is, all decisions of the Conference must be agreed by all members participating, all 35 states. This makes decisions extraordinarily difficult and, I think, accounts for the fact that we have been working 2 years to develop the texts which are only now beginning to reach final form.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Hartman. How large is our delegation?

Mr. HARTMAN. I believe it is between 10 and 14 members. The delegation is headed by our Ambassador to Czechoslovakia who comes down to Geneva, stays there during the sessions and then goes back to his post during the times when the Conference is in recess. I have been in meetings at Geneva and discussed the issues at the Conference as well as at NATO ministerial meetings.

Mr. FASCELL. Does the rest of the delegation stay in Geneva?

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. And they have been there 10 years?

Mr. HARTMAN. No, they have been there for 2 years, some of them on temporary assignment. Mr. Russell goes over as our lawyer, and the lawyers sort of switch off and on.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Pursuing the chairman's question, are we the only delegation that does not have a permanent head?

Mr. HARTMAN. No. Actually he is permanent in that he is there when the Conference is in session. In other words, that is his first priority even over being at his post in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is the name of our Ambassador to Czechoslovakia?

Mr. HARTMAN. Bud Sherer.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Prior to Mr. Sherer, who headed the delegation?

Mr. HARTMAN. Gene Boster.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Did Mr. Boster stay there all the time when he headed the delegation?

Mr. HARTMAN. He stayed there all the time, yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. After Mr. Boster left and Mr. Sherer came on, was there a change in the way the matter was handled?

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes, but as Ambassador Sherer was senior and more experienced, we wanted him to take on this mission.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. At the time that Mr. Boster was there, I recall ours was the only delegation that didn't have a person at the ambassadorial level.

Mr. HARTMAN. That is one of the reasons we made a change—to have an ambassadorial representative. Some of the other delegations have their people commuting from capitals which is quite easy for them to do.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I recall the Soviets had two ambassadors.

Mr. HARTMAN. They had three at one point, including a Deputy Minister.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes. The point I am getting at is that we have downplayed this Conference in the last few years and suddenly we are discovering it is more high powered than we thought. If in fact the Conference culminates in a summit meeting, it is going to be seen by people around the world as a very important event.

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, it is perfectly true that we have downplayed the meetings themselves; in fact, the running of the Conference has been largely in the hands of the Europeans who have been more anxious to have this kind of Conference dialog with the eastern countries and the Soviet Union. I think there has been a feeling on the part of many of the Western European states that as the détente process developed and as the United States and the Soviet Union had their own bilateral discussions and dialog, that somehow or other Europe was being left out. Therefore they were anxious themselves to have some process in which they would participate and in which they would be able to deal with some of the concerns that they had.

They agreed with us—and we have had a very strong NATO position—that the Conference should not go forward until certain prior conditions have been met. The most important of those prior conditions was that the situation in Berlin had to be clarified and made more stable so that people could genuinely begin to think about talking of longer range relationships in Europe. Agreement was needed to resolve this central issue while leaving for later settlement any question of the permanent status of Berlin and Germany.

The agreement on Berlin that was produced among the Four Powers we considered to be a satisfactory one. That condition having been met, we agreed with the European states to go ahead and have this Conference, and we also agreed with them that it had to be a balanced Conference; that is, it could not just deal with the issues that were of most importance to the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. Therefore, we insisted, with good Western European support, that the Conference also deal with human rights issues on which there was much concern among our populations and in Western Europe. We were joined in this by most of the neutral countries in Europe.

One of the interesting things to me has been that the neutrals have been working very closely with the allied and NATO delegations in this conference.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Pursuing that, has there been any independent spirit shown by any of the Eastern bloc countries at the Conference?

Mr. HARTMAN. It is difficult to assert what is independent spirit and what just might be an agreed tactic that one country put forward a proposal as against another country. It is perfectly true that in our bilateral conversations we have noticed differences in positions among the eastern countries. We have also noticed that they attach importance to such things as the confidence-building measures for their own reasons, not necessarily because they belong to the Warsaw Pact but because they are very anxious to build up a system of military relationships which gives some assurance that surprise events will not disturb relationships. I think it is true to say that on some of the proposals we have noticed differences of view among the Warsaw Pact states.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Wouldn't Romania like to see the Conference take a position on the inviolability of borders?

Mr. HARTMAN. That is correct.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am curious, Mr. Hartman, whether there is an inconsistency between the last paragraph in your statement where you urge the United States to participate in the Conference at the summit level and the end of the first paragraph where you say that "we and our Allies have made no final commitments to conclude this Conference at the summit."

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes; that is true.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is the situation?

Mr. HARTMAN. It is true we have made no commitment. All of the Allies have taken the position that until they know the results of stage II and until those results are deemed to be satisfactory, they do not wish to make a commitment to go with the summit.

In fact, there have been a number of conversations by senior European statesmen with Soviet Government ministers and officials in which semicommitments have been made. They have all been conditioned. People have said, we will not go to the summit unless the results of the Conference are satisfactory; but an expectation has been built up that when a result is achieved, if you accept it, it will by definition be satisfactory and therefore there will be no inhibition on going to the summit.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Has the United States made the same commitment?

Mr. HARTMAN. It has not made a specific commitment but it has said the same things in terms of a satisfactory result.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In other words, if the United States finds the result satisfactory, President Ford will go to the summit meeting in Helsinki?

Mr. HARTMAN. That is right.

The other important thing to recall is that this is a conference in which our European partners have taken the lead. We would, I think, be very mistaken not to follow them also in the culminating stages of this Conference. If they had their senior leaders going to this meeting and making statements there, it would be a mistake if the President did not go.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Does Mr. Brezhnev want President Ford to come to this meeting.

Mr. HARTMAN. I am sure he does.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Winn.

Mr. WINN. What is the relationship between the Conference and the MBFR? It seems to me that there is quite a bit of overlapping.

Mr. HARTMAN. There is a little bit of overlap. First of all, one of the agreements that we think was achieved by agreeing to go ahead with this Conference was an agreement on the part of the eastern bloc states, the Warsaw Pact states, to begin the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna. Now since CSCE is a broader conference, it includes the neutral states; it is not just the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The neutral countries also felt that they should be discussing security relationships in Europe. Therefore, there is a portion of the CSCE conference that deals with trying to build greater confidence and to eliminate the sources of tension. However, it will not get into

the kind of discussion between the Warsaw Pact and NATO that the Vienna talks will get into in terms of trying to reduce armaments. What they have been talking about up to now in CSCE are peripheral things that tend to help build confidence and reduce tension.

Mr. WINN. Such as?

Mr. HARTMAN. Such as exchanging observers. That is one that has already been agreed. This would be on a voluntary basis but it is thought that if this is possible it will build confidence that these maneuvers are not going to be the prelude to taking actions against one side or the other.

The other proposal that has been discussed for a long time is the actual notification in advance of maneuvers, and here the dispute has been first of all where the maneuvers take place. If there are maneuvers, for example, in the western portion of the Soviet Union, should those be notified to all the participants in this Conference? Should they be notified only to her neighbors which would be notifying only other Warsaw Pact states? What size maneuvers should be notified? How much time should be allowed for the advance notification?

I think the parties are coming closer together at the Conference but this will be one of the last things to be settled because it is the thing that is particularly sensitive on the Soviet side. There is a NATO position in the subject which is strongly backed by the neutrals; it is to try and allow as much time as possible for advance notification so that all concerned will be well aware when maneuvers are scheduled; to have the numbers of personnel covered rather low so that all major maneuvers would be notified and to provide notification in an area covering all of Europe with no boundaries.

Now we think that the Soviet Union will finally accept an area which includes a part of their western territory but not all of the European part of the Soviet Union to the Urals. As far as we are concerned, we will notify them of maneuvers in Western Europe all the way out into the ocean because we are a perfectly open society. People usually know when our maneuvers are going on in any case, so we are perfectly happy to include all of Western Europe. We would hope to include the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries so as to have notification over all Eastern Europe plus some margin of the western part of the Soviet Union.

That is all that the CSCE will deal with in terms of military security affairs whereas the heart of the MBFR talks goes much more seriously into reductions of forces and kinds of forces, but just between the participants on the central front.

Mr. WINN. I have attended some of their meetings and met with the two Soviet Ambassadors over there. Well, for instance, are these observers strictly military?

Mr. HARTMAN. It has not been decided. I think it is left to each state to determine who will observe, but I think it would be a military observer.

Mr. WINN. Would this type of observation include an advance notice of a move similar to the one that the Russians made toward the Mideast and then our calling them on it?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, you mean in terms of the alert?

Mr. WINN. Yes.

Mr. HARTMAN. Under what we have been discussing at this Conference, alert measures have not been a subject for advance notification. Strictly military maneuvers.

Mr. WINN. It is my understanding that the Russians did make the military maneuvers by moving certain divisions.

Mr. HARTMAN. I think that is right.

Mr. WINN. Then we alerted our troops.

Mr. HARTMAN. No. Certainly we had information about both their movement and their alert procedures through our intelligence sources.

Mr. WINN. That is all I have at the present time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hartman, I have a number of questions, so let me refer specifically to your statement; I think it will be easiest if we just work off of that.

You made reference on page 2 of your statement to western priorities. You state that the Western and neutral participant states have been emphasizing improving, not freezing, the status quo. Then you follow that with the statement:

For our part, we have approached this Conference on the premise that if détente is to endure, all sides must benefit.

That is not an effort to disassociate the United States from the views of the Western and neutrals on the matter of improving rather than freezing?

Mr. HARTMAN. No; it is not. It would certainly be our view that one way to improve relations is also to have more openness on both sides, and many of the measures are designed to do that through encouraging greater exchanges. That is what we mean by not freezing the situation and not trying to impede the present practice. We want to see present practice develop and develop in a hopeful way.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, our participation has been in support of those Western and neutral approaches?

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about your statement on page 3 where you discuss the status of the results you discuss? Quoting, "the emerging CSCE documents." Now what is meant by emerging at this point?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, let me tell you a little bit about the process. Mr. Russell knows more about it than I do, but there are 35 countries involved and you must achieve agreement of all participants on a text. What happens is that various texts are submitted to committees. The committees look them over, and try to narrow the differences. When they cannot narrow the differences they usually bracket parts of them. The text will then continue to be circulated with large numbers of brackets and in some, practically the whole text is bracketed. The committees continue to go over these texts and try to change the words until they can achieve agreement by all participants on a text.

When I say "emerging," that is what I mean; the text is emerging gradually out of the removal of these brackets. On our side we have attempted, and I think rather successfully, to hold common positions among the NATO countries. Indeed, on occasion those positions are joined by others who are not members of NATO. So it is a little bit

easier if we are within NATO. We sometimes have a discussion about what position to take, but at the Conference there is usually one country that is designated to speak on each particular topic. Emerging is literally the process. It is the gradual coming out of what these texts are finally going to be.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In the so-called spirit of seeking a consensus?

Mr. HARTMAN. Seeking a consensus, yes. But all along the NATO countries have had certain basic principles in their mind, things that they would either not accept or very much wanted to make sure were in these documents in order to achieve balance.

Mr. DERWINSKI. For example, if you work out language on the subject of inviolability of frontiers, which is the Soviet phrase, will there be any official U.S. statement attached to the document or formal public statement expressing the fact that that phrase "inviolability of frontiers" does not constitute our recognition of the illegal Soviet seizure of the Baltic States?

Mr. HARTMAN. I am not sure whether we will be making a statement at the Conference but my testimony today is a statement of the official U.S. Government position. We have said in letters to various committees on the Hill what our position is, and if there are doubts when this language comes out, I am sure, we will find a way to express our view as to what this language means.

Mr. FASCELL. Will the gentleman yield at this point?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, there will be included in the record a letter from Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, to Dr. Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman of the Committee on House Concurrent Resolution 11 and other resolutions. The letter refers to the statement that Mr. Hartman makes.

[The letter follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., April 11, 1975.

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of February 26 requesting the Department's comments on H. Con. Res. 3, H. Con. Res. 11, H. Con. Res. 79, H. Con. Res. 105, H. Con. Res. 111, H. Con. Res. 118, H. Con. Res. 122, H. Con. Res. 132, H. Con. Res. 140 and H. Con. Res. 149, expressing the sense of Congress concerning nonrecognition by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltic States.

The Department affirms that it remains the policy of the United States not to recognize the forcible annexation of the Baltic States by the USSR.

The Department of State agrees with the resolutions' stipulations that the United States delegation to the Conference should not agree to the recognition by the Conference of the Soviet Union's forcible annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. We expect that the Conference will adopt a declaration of principles which will include respect for "frontier inviolability" but in our view this will not involve recognition of the forcible annexation of the Baltic States. At the same time, at the initiative of the Western delegations to the Conference, the declaration of principles will include specific references to the possibility of peaceful border changes, to self-determination, and to respect for human rights.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Mr. DERWINSKI. My concern is that it is perfectly understandable for the Department of State to be communicating with congressional committees and Members of Congress, but it seems to me that of necessity these should be followed up with a statement either at the Conference or one distributed throughout the diplomatic community making it clear the reservation of the United States as to that phrase or any other questionable phrase in the final document.

Mr. HARTMAN. The other thing that I think I ought to point out is the status of these documents. We are very anxious not to give the impression, because it is certainly not our intent nor the intent of any of the other Western Powers, that these documents have some kind of legal standing which they do not have. These are declarations of intent. I admit they have political weight but they are not and should not be treated as legally binding documents.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Let me raise a question that refers to another delicate matter—this is the basket 1 agenda item. There is a subject “nonintervention in internal affairs.” I assume to the Soviet Union this means that something like the Jackson-Vanik amendment is an interference in internal affairs. Again I am assuming—since this is not a formal peace treaty and it would not be submitted to the Senate for ratification—that obviously there must be some statement to be made either as part of the discussion or as a full communication to our allies and to the Eastern Powers that this obviously does not constitute any position by the State Department favoring the Soviet interpretation of the position as opposed to the act passed by Congress.

Mr. HARTMAN. Absolutely. We have made very clear, for example, not only under the first item on the agenda but in our discussion of the economic portions under agenda item 2 that while the wish is expressed that trade be conducted on a most-favored-nation basis, there is nothing that commits us to move by any other way of implementation than by our Trade Act.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In the letter Chairman Fascell placed in the record there was a reference to self-determination of peoples and now again this is a positive position that we take.

Mr. HARTMAN. Right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Is it contemplated that again by a proper and timely public statement that we would place emphasis on this question of self-determination of peoples and that this obviously ought to relate to the Baltic states and the other peoples within the USSR, who as far as we are concerned, are deprived of their rights of self-determination?

Mr. HARTMAN. There are some obvious disadvantages in playing up certain principles which the Soviet Union can itself make unilateral statements about, but as you point out there are things in here with respect, for example, to self-determination which are very valuable and weighty on our side, and things that we ought to continue to say, and things that we will point to in the future. If we have had a difference of view between ourselves and the Europeans, I think it has probably been that the Europeans have thought it valuable to repeat many of these principles, to repeat many of the things that we have said in past declarations of human rights and to hold this up as a standard to which we are now going to look for compliance and deeds.

We, too, have thought that this was useful, but I think we have felt that the final result of this Conference would perhaps be less ambitious than some of the European statesmen have thought. Now, as they get closer to the final stages of this Conference, many of our European friends are lowering their sights a bit as to how much they think they are going to be able to get in these documents.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Western European?

Mr. HARTMAN. Western European friends.

Mr. DERWINSKI. If I may, Mr. Chairman, ask one other question then.

One of the things the Western Powers, and I presume the neutral countries of Europe will stress, is the point of family reunification.

Mr. HARTMAN. That is correct.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Here, the great stumbling block has been the policies of a few Eastern European countries that has not permitted the free flow of people that this envisions. What progress can we achieve beyond just language?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, to be sure, there is going to be language. It will not have a legally binding effect, but we think in the text that has been put forward and almost agreed to at this point that we can now see what its final shape will be. Thanks, I must say, to the really very good work by the Canadians and Germans who pursued this particular topic very vigorously. We have a text which provides some standards, provides some specific details of what it means to take action in the field of family reunification.

Now to be sure, it is not a legally binding text but it is another kind of public standard that we can point to and say, "Hey, what about this case; you are not living up to this."

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about the Soviet policy which we, the Members of Congress, have struggled with on behalf of constituents, and that is when one of our constituents marries a Soviet national they have been unusually uncooperative?

Mr. HARTMAN. We have many cases.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I am being diplomatic when I say that; they have been down right ornery. What about that?

Mr. HARTMAN. There is a separate text on assisting and keeping united married people from different states. Again it will be an encouragement, it will be a kind of public admonition that this sort of thing ought to be encouraged and that governments ought to take steps to allow these marriages to go forward and allow parties to choose where they are going to live.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, may I just return to one point.

Do I understand then, Mr. Hartman, that notwithstanding any interpretation that the Soviets might give to the final language and assuming that perhaps we could induce the State Department to issue a proper public statement as part of the concluding phase of the Conference that it does and will continue to remain the policy of the United States not to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the U.S.S.R.?

Mr. HARTMAN. That is correct.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I note in your statement, pursuing the discussion of the gentleman from Illinois, you indicated that you had officially answered correspondence from Members of Congress to this effect. You are here now making a public statement to this effect?

Mr. HARTMAN. That is correct.

Mr. BUCHANAN. And we will do so at the Conference itself?

Mr. HARTMAN. No, I did not say what we would do at the Conference itself. I said that we have made this an official position of ours. The delegations have not yet registered in the record of the Conference their interpretations because we don't have final texts on these documents. I rather doubt that in the final stages each country will get up and give its own interpretation of every decision that the Conference is taking. However, there will be opportunities in the course of either the acceptance of the final documents or statements that we would put out at the time we accepted the documents for making our position clear on those things where there could be any doubt as to what our position is.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, of course I know it was the Soviets who pressed for this thing through the years as your statement indicates and to some extent it appears to me that they have been caught in the trap of their own hypocrisy. Once it got started the Europeans especially seem to have made it a painful experience for the Soviets rather than a happy one. I am very happy that that is the case but I am a little concerned about this basket 1 list of principles and the inclusion therein of nonintervention in internal affairs especially pertaining to what that might be interpreted as including even though it may not be binding in the very important matters such as improved communication, freer travel, emigration policies, human rights within countries and so forth.

Mr. HARTMAN. Right.

Mr. BUCHANAN. We are in a position for all the world to see the policies of the United States and Western Europe and for that to be a continuing pressure on the Soviet Union and those societies that are more closed.

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Now on this nonintervention, can that be interpreted as including Voice of America?

Mr. HARTMAN. No.

Mr. BUCHANAN. And other such activities?

Mr. HARTMAN. No.

Mr. BUCHANAN. British Broadcasting?

Mr. HARTMAN. No. We are specifically dealing with the question of radios. That is one of the questions that is still outstanding—trying to get a commitment in writing that there will be no further jamming.

From our point of view the purpose of all of these documents is to achieve a further opening up. It is really on the basis of that process taking place that people are going to have increasing confidence that something is not going on that they don't like or that the societies are not continuing to exercise a repression that people can't find out about on the outside. We recognize that all of this is not going to happen overnight. There are basic differences that have existed for years between us and between our systems but there are things that we can do in accepting some of these documents and talking more

about these things publicly and getting people to travel more back and forth that over a period of time can lead to a loosening up of the societies in Eastern Europe and indeed in the Soviet Union.

Now this is not a panacea, we don't want to overexaggerate the results that we think can flow from this. I think in Europe there has been a tendency to think that somehow or other this Conference was going to result in major changes overnight. I think they are much more realistic today about that. At the same time these are useful things to say. They do not undercut the more comprehensive statements that have already been made on such things as the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights but they tend to supplement them, to make more specific the things that are particularly concerned in relations between the Eastern European and Soviet Union and Western European and United States relationships—things that are evident in our day-to-day relations.

We mentioned marriage problems. There is not a week that goes by where I don't have a letter from a family or an individual in the United States who has run into difficulties either with marriage or family reunification problems. This is also true in Europe. These things are gradually being negotiated, and some of them in fact are now getting settled without Government intervention which is a hopeful sign. It is going to take time before we achieve the kind of relationship—and we don't know that we will ever achieve it—that we have among the Western European countries, where this kind of thing is not a problem. But we think that, marginally, these statements and the attention that is focused by this Conference on these problems, will be helpful.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Well, I must say, Mr. Hartman, thus far this has seemed a more positive than negative experience, and I am sure our team is a significant part of that.

Mr. HARTMAN. Quite frankly, I think if some of those who suggested this Conference 20-odd years ago were formulating their plans today they probably would not have suggested this kind of conference because it has really devoted a tremendous amount of public attention to themes which I don't think they are all that anxious to have publicly aired.

Mr. BUCHANAN. One footnote, Mr. Chairman, I was in Europe the spring before the Czechoslovakian incident and at that point all the Europeans were saying that the differences between North and South were greater than the differences between East and West, and what we needed to do was to disarm and join hands in doing something about the developing world, which I think is a great idea, if you can get it done. There was at that point a feeling of great euphoria about the détente that then existed; but then came Czechoslovakia. So it does seem to me that there is a bit of a European habit of being a little overoptimistic about it.

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, it is particularly difficult, I think, when you move away from confrontation with a clear ideological split and military security tensions to a situation which is much more difficult to handle both diplomatically and publicly—of trying to decrease tension while yet quite different systems oppose each other with the potential for conflict still there. How do you keep people interested in maintaining defense? Because without adequate defense there is no way to pursue a détente policy, there is no incentive at all for a

negotiation that might lead to a mutually satisfactory reduction of force on both sides.

This is something I think our NATO heads of government are going to have to address their attention to when they get together at the end of this month. How do you maintain the support for the essential security policies in the alliance at a time when you are encouraging people to believe, and we believe ourselves, that a process of relaxation of tensions between East and West is possible, but only based on the maintenance of strength? We will need your help.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I like that kind of talk.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Hartman, obviously we see the Conference as a part of the process of opening up. But what is it the Russians want?

Mr. HARTMAN. I think that they are looking for their original objective. Since they could not get an official peace conference and peace treaty which would in effect write into international law the status quo in Europe, they wanted a conference which at least would give some impression in that respect. Over the years we have conditioned our participation in this process in two ways: (1) by trying to get agreement on some of the real problems, like Berlin, out of the way, and (2) to get them to engage seriously with us in a discussion of problems that we thought would genuinely lead to a reduction in tension—for example, an agreement to begin talks on mutual balanced force reductions in Vienna—and generally to promise a dialog which we think has important conditioning effects on general behavior.

If you are looking forward to a conference with 34 other countries for a discussion of all these topics, you don't want to put yourself in the position where people would say you are acting in an inconsistent fashion to the development of that kind of dialog and discussion.

We think that the kinds of statements that are being made, the lack of any legally binding character in these documents, offers a series of undertakings and policy statements by governments that point toward an improvement and a possibility of opening up on some of these issues which we think will be helpful in furthering our goals. Now obviously from the Soviet point of view they do have certain advantages. They are able to interpret, if they wish, a straight statement that frontiers should be inviolable without mentioning the fact that in another principle we have, with some effort, placed a reference to the possibility for peaceful change of borders.

There is no sure way of avoiding that kind of a differing interpretation, but publicly I think we have gotten and we will get documents which can be well supported publicly and which will serve our policy goals.

Mr. FASCELL. Where does the principle of peaceful border change appear?

Mr. HARTMAN. It will appear in the principle of sovereignty. One of the attributes of sovereignty is that borders may be changed by peaceful means and by agreement. This is a negotiation in which, in order to be able to offset the argument that inviolability is the only principle, we were instrumental in getting that provision accepted and in getting it put into the sovereignty principle. We did this also very much at the behest of the German Government where this is, of course,

a very touchy issue because we have all agreed on the Western side that the final status of Germany and Berlin will be determined only when there is a peace conference.

Mr. FASCELL. Aren't both of those principles regarded as norms in international law now?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, I would certainly hope so, but it can stand repeating.

Mr. FASCELL. So the accomplishment would be a restatement of principles?

Mr. HARTMAN. It is a restatement of principles.

Mr. FASCELL. Agreed to by consensus?

Mr. HARTMAN. That is correct; with a lot of other things and particularly in the third agenda item.

Mr. FASCELL. Is MBFR the carrot for the continuation of CSCE?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, I don't know. You mean for a followup institutional process in the CSCE?

Mr. FASCELL. Whatever.

Mr. HARTMAN. I think the MBFR has got to have a character of its own. In other words, unless there is a balance of interests on the part of the participating states in the negotiations in Vienna to reduce forces on the central front, you won't have a satisfactory result. As for the link between the CSCE and MBFR, we felt in our minds, that as went into a conference we were not all that enthusiastic about a linkage. We thought something else more serious should be going on in the security area, trying to deal with the central security problems in reducing tensions in Europe.

The MBFR Conference began but it has not achieved results as yet. One reason we think it has moved so slowly is that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries were very anxious to see whether or not there was going to be any result in the CSCE. Now that they see that there will be a result; this will enable them at least to claim that they have had this European-wide conference, to which they really attach a tremendous amount of importance. It is going to be quite a gathering, 35 heads of government getting together in Helsinki to say that there ought to be a new set of relationships among the European states. Once the Soviets see that that has happened, we think that there are other reasons why they should be interested in pursuing the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna and that we will begin to see some progress in that area.

Mr. FASCELL. Is MBFR in recess now?

Mr. HARTMAN. At the moment it is in recess but it will pick up again I think next month or the end of this month.

Mr. WINN. Mr. Resor.

Mr. HARTMAN. I think he is going to testify sometime this week.

Mr. FASCELL. You say that a precondition to going into the CSCE was the resolution of the Berlin problem. How was that resolved?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, we stated on a number of occasions in NATO communiques and in public statements of our leaders that we would not move forward to accept a European Conference on Security and Cooperation until there had been a satisfactory resolution and agreement on Berlin and on the negotiations between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. These negotiations had been going on for some time. By 1971 they were concluded and implemented in the following year. So it was at that point that we said,

all right, now we are prepared to go and have a meeting on European security and cooperation.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there unrestricted travel to and from Berlin now?

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes. We think the agreements in fact have buttressed our rights there and have made quite clear certain things that were fuzzy or had caused some difficulty over the years on the original Berlin agreements in the postwar period. We think that this has led to greater stability there. There have not been any serious incidents or buildup of tension in the area. Procedures are established for settling any disputes about the terms of the agreement.

We think that this was a really important step in this whole process because the area of most tension was Berlin, the area of most disagreement was between the Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic because of the fundamental differences they have whether there will be unification and whether there will be a future German state. Therefore, before you got to a broader process of easing tensions throughout Europe, you had to deal with those problems. In fact, we think that they have been dealt with, that relationships have been building up between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. We waited until after this process had been complete before recognizing the German Democratic Republic, which we have now done, so those things were really gotten out of the way before we got to this Conference.

Mr. FASCELL. For 30 years now there has been no peace treaty and one could reasonably conclude that there will be another 30 years without a peace treaty.

Mr. HARTMAN. That could be.

Mr. FASCELL. One could therefore conclude that a peace treaty is not needed from the Russian point of view and that the negotiation agreement on a set of principles satisfactory to the Soviet bloc would be all that is required.

In our effort to achieve our objectives in terms of opening up societies and a restatement of humanitarian principles it would seem to me that the restatement of those principles, while desirable, is really not an action program.

What specific action, if any, would we interpret as an acceptance of the principles for which all the Western and neutrals have been working for?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, it seems to me that once the agreements of this Conference have been completed, we have to continue to do some of the things that we have been doing bilaterally. Perhaps we can encourage some multilateral approaches in these fields but the exchanges that have been going on should continue—the cultural and the scientific exchanges, the greater amount of tourism, the greater amount of exchange of information, as a way of beginning to change the character of the societies—I mean we have open societies on our side; everything is freely accessible, people know what is going on.

We think that there is some progress in this area—people are moving around more, there are some agreements that are taking place that have been negotiated for a movement of people. We are not the only ones, for example, who have been talking to the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union about emigration problems. The Germans have, for example, some talks going on with several countries in Eastern Europe about ex-German nationals emigrating.

All of these actions at least keep a focus of public attention on the problem and that is the way you bring about improvements, not by refusing to discuss problems but by gradually just making it more of a normal situation to have greater exchanges. These things are not brought up constantly as political confrontations, because when they are brought up as political confrontations it is our feeling that that just closes up the possibility of making progress.

Mr. FASCELL. What does constitute the termination of stage II and when do we expect that?

Mr. HARTMAN. Agreement on these texts. That could come about as early as mid-June. The Finns have told us it will take them about 6 weeks to get prepared for a meeting at stage III which would be the meeting—

Mr. FASCELL. That would lead to the initial steps of stage III?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, stage III will be just a day or two of approving these documents and making speeches.

Mr. FASCELL. At the highest level?

Mr. HARTMAN. At the highest level if that is the final agreement. As I say, no Western country has yet absolutely said they will send their head of government. They have all conditioned their statements, but my expectation is that it will be.

Mr. FASCELL. When a satisfactory conclusion of stage II or consensus has been reached, then a decision will be reached as to how stage III will be set?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, it is decided that the meeting will be in Helsinki and it is just a question of how long it will take to get organized,

Mr. FASCELL. But it has not yet been decided how high up the level will be?

Mr. HARTMAN. Not firmly, but the expectation is running toward heads of government.

Mr. FASCELL. What do the westerners and neutrals expect? Once the Soviet bloc claims a political victory and they do that for a reasonable length of time, then after that dies off, what next?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, each side will present obviously what it thinks it got out of the Conference.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not talking about that.

Mr. HARTMAN. Even at the Conference people say things.

Mr. FASCELL. I am talking about the conclusion of stage III. We have a difference of opinion as to where we go next.

Mr. HARTMAN. Right. Well, there is a genuine difference of opinion as to whether or not it is to our advantage to have a permanent committee established which constantly reviews the operation of these resolutions. Some people would say from our point of view that maybe it is a good idea to have a permanent committee there; then you could be constantly bringing up these cases and say you are not living up to some of these things that you have already agreed to, for example, in the third basket.

The original position, was not to have a followup mechanism and institutionalize it. There was a feeling on our part and our allies that that could give the Soviet Union an opportunity to kibitz and make a lot of suggestions about the operation of our alliance, particularly if they have some means by these declarations to talk about security

matters and that somehow or other it would give them more of an opportunity to intervene in the public discussion process in the West.

Now some people may have changed their minds about that but we are still in the same position we were 2 years ago; namely, a reluctance on the part of the West to have an institutionalized mechanism and a proposal by the East to have one. I am not sure that is still the position on both sides.

Mr. FASCELL. You may be worse by the time you get through with stage III.

Mr. HARTMAN. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. But it seems reasonable that you would at least want a measure of Soviet actions or Eastern bloc actions after the culmination of stage III to see how they handled it and to get some measure of where they are going in terms of propaganda and political effort.

Mr. HARTMAN. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It seems then that the area where there may be varying or conflicting interpretations will revolve around a number of items under basket 1 and basket 3.

Mr. HARTMAN. I think that is probably true, yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. We keep discussing blocs, neutral country blocs, Western blocs, Eastern blocs. What has been the pattern of performance of Albania at this conference?

Mr. HARTMAN. Albania is the one European country that is not there.

Mr. DERWINSKI. They have not attended?

Mr. HARTMAN. That is the only one.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about Yugoslavia, have they shown any deviation from the Eastern bloc?

Mr. HARTMAN. Absolutely. They have and they have made it quite clear throughout the Conference that they are acting independently, that they do not follow either bloc; if anything, that they have their own views and they are going to express them. They have been responsible in several cases for key proposals that have been made and indeed the final compromise proposals when that has been necessary.

They have been quite clearly taking an independent position.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about Romania?

Mr. HARTMAN. To a certain extent.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Much more limited than Yugoslavia?

STATEMENT OF HAROLD S. RUSSELL, OFFICE DIRECTOR, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, LEGAL ADVISER'S OFFICE

Mr. RUSSELL. I would say so; more outspoken.

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, Hal has been there but I don't like to characterize it, frankly.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about our allies, have any of them been unusually outspoken on any of these issues we have expressed concern about during this morning—for example, the question of the frontier and the "inviolability of frontiers" phrase?

Mr. HARTMAN. The "inviolability of frontiers" phrase has been one of greater sensitivity to the Germans as far as participants are concerned. They, therefore, took the lead in discussing this and finally came up with the suggestion that we modify the inviolability principle with the clause on peaceful change. After they had come up with the principle, they then asked us to be instrumental in its negotiation with the Soviet Union which we were. That was one of the key compromises that led to any of us thinking that this Conference was going to end—because without some reference to the peaceful change principle I doubt very much that our Western European friends, and possibly even ourselves, would have been willing to go to a final conference, if all that was left was the straight declaration of the inviolability of frontiers.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I find it difficult to put great credence in a statement that when you get to basket 1 and you resolve language that calls for freedom of religion when a participating state has as its basic constitutional structure that of atheism. How do you reconcile the official atheism of the Soviet Union with language calling for freedom of religion?

Mr. HARTMAN. All I can say is that these are statements of intent. Statements—if you call them statements—of policy. As we see evidence that they are not adhering to these policies, then we say, "All right, you signed this document. You came here with 34 other countries and agreed to this. Why are you not applying it?" It is a public standard, it is not a legal obligation.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about the subject of equal rights and self-determination, how would that be applied in the positive or at least how would we publicly emphasize our concern over such things as Russification of the Baltic states, deliberate movement of Russian settlers into the Baltic states and forced movement of the Baltic peoples out? The same thing could occur in Soviet Armenia or the Ukraine, and other sections of the Soviet Union. How does that enter into our interpretation?

Mr. HARTMAN. Well, the principle of self-determination has been reiterated, and one of the reasons for our not accepting what has happened there is that self-determination did not take place. That has been our position right straight through since this occurred. I am sure we will continue to say these things afterward, and our feeling is that, again marginally, having this in an agreed statement of principles is another argument we will be using to say that this is something that should happen.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me that all statements of principles are an opportunity for both parties to say exactly where they are on important issues and how they hope to move forward on those issues provided they have common ground. But, frankly, I don't see how it is going to change a thing. I am not being cynical, just pragmatic.

Once a border is established, it is established and once the people have been incorporated they are incorporated. That is not to say the statement of principles should not be adopted or that an act which is in violation of an international norm ought not to be recognized as such but it certainly does not say that there is ever going to be any change without some kind of armed conflict. I don't think anybody is advocating that. That leads me to ask what differences exist with

respect to final determination of the 10th item in agenda item No. 1, fulfillment of obligations. You might have to strike that one.

Mr. HARTMAN. I am not sure what the current discussion is. One of the outstanding issues between us on that is a need by the four allies who have rights in Berlin to put something into these documents which indicates that these documents, even though they have no legal effect, in no way alter, change or modify our rights in Berlin, the quadripartite rights. So it is the negotiation of that language which would go into the 10th principle that is at least one of the issues that is holding it up from being agreed, but we will get that.

Mr. FASCELL. I find it difficult to support a disclaimer where there is no legal need for it, but I guess there is a strong political reason.

Mr. HARTMAN. There are going to be disclaimers throughout these documents. There are going to be little words thrown in, for example, on the human rights.

Mr. FASCELL. Perhaps it is useful to get a document where everybody's positions are reasonably set forth and clarified.

Mr. HARTMAN. For example, I received a delegation from the American Jewish community who were quite concerned that since the area and the specifics of human rights dealt with within these documents might be less comprehensive than the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, would this in any way be seen as a modification? Well, there are going to be words in here that will make it quite clear that that is not the case.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Russell.

Mr. RUSSELL. On this point, Congressman, we have been concerned that though not a legal document some formulations could be considered a waiver of a legal position and in particular the principle of sovereign equality when applied to the German Democratic Republic, which is at this Conference with us for the first time, might cast certain doubts over the continued viability of our residual rights in Germany. Therefore, although not a legal document, it has been felt that it would be prudent to make sure explicitly on the record that there is a reservation of Four Power rights.

Mr. FASCELL. I imagine for the same reason the West Germans want to keep alive the possibility, no matter how remote, of the reunification of Germany.

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Derwinski, I was interested in following your line of comment with respect to the Baltic states. I assume that the U.S. position is totally satisfactory and it certainly appears to be to me.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes. I think the concern I have is, for example, the point you just made, Mr. Russell, that we would specifically state the fact that we were not in any way by participating with the East Germans in this Conference waiving our rights to Berlin. It seems to me that it then makes it incumbent to attach at some point the proper statement reemphasizing the fact that our policy in the Baltic states does remain what it has been for 35 years.

Mr. HARTMAN. I will say in addition to my public testimony and to the letters that we have put with the committee, we will examine also how this might be stated more directly connected with the results.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Have you ever tried to test the good will of the Soviets by suggesting that one of these sessions open with a prayer?

Mr. HARTMAN. I don't believe so.

Mr. DERWINSKI. This would be a psychological test.

Mr. HARTMAN. Yes, and with the Vatican present at these meetings—

[Laughter.]

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Hartman, does the United States still maintain its position on the Baltic states?

Mr. HARTMAN. It has not changed.

Mr. FASCELL. How has the United States operated internally with respect to decisions on Conference issues?

Mr. HARTMAN. Depending on what the subject is. For example, on the economic subjects we have a committee that is composed of ourselves in the State Department, the Special Trade Representatives Office, Treasury, and Commerce. On the military confidence building measures, we have a committee that is composed of the NSC staff, Defense, and ourselves. On the other items, which are more strictly within the purview of the State Department, we have the Inter-Office Committee. The major positions are all put to the Secretary of State for his decision.

Mr. FASCELL. How has the United States coordinated its position with its allies?

Mr. HARTMAN. In two ways. There have been two caucuses. There has been a caucus of the nine; that is, of the European Community member states, in which under their political cooperation arrangements they have talked about taking common positions. Indeed, sometimes at the Conference the European Community appoints a single spokesman. The chairman of that happens to be the Irish Government at the moment, but another member state may be asked to speak to a particular topic.

Then there is the broader coordination that takes place in NATO either by a caucus of all NATO members sitting in Geneva at the Conference site or periodically by discussions in the NATO Council to set policy for the next period of the negotiations. Sometimes we send experts from capitals to these meetings; CSCE, MBFR and generally stated East-West relations and talks come up on each of our NATO Council agendas when the Secretary of State goes twice a year to the NATO meetings. Indeed when the President goes at the end of this month to the NATO Council meeting, this will be an important subject on the agenda.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Are there any other questions?

Does either one of you gentlemen, Mr. Frowick or Mr. Russell, want to add anything at this point?

Without objection then, we will keep the record open for 15 days from the date of this meeting to allow interested organizations to file statements in the record on this subject.

I want to thank you very much, gentlemen, for giving us such a very thorough and concise review on this important subject. We appreciate your cooperation.

Mr. HARTMAN. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]

APPENDIX

LETTER FROM EDWARD J. SUMANAS, THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN
COMMITTEE TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL ENCLOSING LIST OF
COSPONSORS OF RESOLUTIONS REGARDING BALTIC STATES

THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE,
Rockville, Md;

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
*Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: Enclosed you will find the list of the eighty-nine Congressmen and ten Senators who have co-sponsored the Baltic States Resolution in this year's session. The Joint Baltic American Committee would appreciate the addition of this list to the end of our letter dated May 13, 1975, and the printing of both in the permanent record of the hearings before your Subcommittee on International, Political, and Military affairs.

Respectfully,

EDWARD J. SUMANAS,
*Director of Public Relations,
Joint Baltic American Committee.*

SPONSORS AND CO-SPONSORS OF THE BALTIC STATES RESOLUTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

<i>House Concurrent Resolution No.</i>	<i>House Concurrent Resolution No.</i>
3- *Frank Annunzio (D-Ill.)	11 Edward J. Derwinski (R-Ill.)
165- Henry Hyde (R-Ill.)	165, 179, 189, 199, 216, 255
250 Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.)	105 Samuel Stratton (D-N.Y.) 159,
79 *Frank Horton (R-N.Y.)	183
165 Robert Roe (D-N.J.)	118 Joshua Eilberg (D-Pa.)
140 ¹ James Delaney (D-N.Y.)	132- *Gus Yatron (D-Pa.)
159 *L. A. (Skip) Bafalis (R-Fla.)	165
165 *James Burke (D-Mass.)	149- James Howard (D-N.J.)
165 *John Dingell (D-Mich.)	242
165 *Gilbert Gude (R-Md.)	161 John Ashbrook (R-Ohio)
165 *Edward Koch (D-N.Y.)	165 *William Broomfield (R-Mich.)
165 *George O'Brien (R-Ill.)	165 *Philip Crane (R-Ill.)
165 *Ronald Sarasin (R-Conn.)	165 *Donald Fraser (D-Minn.)
176 Marvin Esch (R-Mich.)	165 *Richard Kelly (R-Fla.)
179 *Ray Madden (D-Ind.)	165 *Robert McClory (R-Ill.)
179 *Martin Russo (D-Ill.)	165 *John Rousselot (R-Calif.)
179 *Marjorie Holt (R-Md.)	169 L. H. Fountain (D-N.C.)
186 Joseph Early (D-Mass.)	180 James Florio (D-N.J.)
189 *Joseph Addabbo (D-N.Y.)	179 *Joe Moakley (D-Mass.)
189 *Floyd Hicks (D-Wash.)	179 *Clarence Long (D-Md.)
189 *Joseph Gaydos (D-Pa.)	182 Edwin Forsythe (R-N.J.)
189 *Henry Helstoski (D-N.J.)	183 ¹ John McCollister (R-Nebr.)
189 *Charles Carney (D-Ohio)	189 *John Erlenborn (R-Ill.)
189 *John Murtha (D-Pa.)	189 *Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.)
194 Daniel Flood (D-Pa.)	189 *William Cotter (D-Conn.)
199 *John Anderson (R-Ill.)	189 *Mark Hannafor (D-Calif.)
199 *T. H. Macdonald (D-Mass.)	189 *Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
199 *Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)	193 Matthew Rinaldo (R-N.J.)
201 Peter Rodino, Jr. (D-N.J.)	195 John Hammerschmidt (R-Ark.)
199 *Joseph Vigorito (D-Pa.)	199 *Garry Brown (R-Mich.)
216 *Mario Biaggi (D-N.Y.)	199 *Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.)
216 *Lawrence Coughlin (R-Pa.)	200 Edward Patten (D-N.J.)
216 *C. W. Bill Young (R-Fla.)	199 *Norman Lent (R-N.Y.)
216 *Tom Hagedorn (R-Minn.)	199 *Thomas Downey (D-N.Y.)
231 J. Herbert Burke (R-Fla.)	216 *Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-N.Y.)
242 William J. Hughes (D-N.J.)	216 *Paul Rogers (D-Fla.)
250 ² Edward P. Beard (D-R.I.)	216 *Leo J. Ryan (D-Calif.)
251 Melvin Price (D-Ill.)	226 H. John Heinz III (R-Pa.)
255 *Herman Badillo (D-N.Y.)	238 Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-N.J.)
255 *Berkley Bedell (D-Iowa)	250 ² Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Md.)
255 *Robert W. Kasten, Jr. (R-Wis.)	250 ² Fernand St Germain (D-R.I.)
255 *Robert L. F. Sikes (D-Fla.)	255 *Jerome A. Ambro (D-N.Y.)
256 Joseph G. Minish (D-N.J.)	255 *Robert E. Bauman (R-Md.)
276 Wayne L. Hays (D-Ohio)	255 *Yvonne Brathwaite Burke
278 Pierre S. du Pont (R-Del.)	(D-Calif.)
	255 *Frederick W. Richmond
	(D-N.Y.)
	255 *William F. Walsh (R-N.Y.)
	262 ² Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.)
	267 Charles W. Whalen Jr. (R-Ohio)

CO-SPONSORS OF SENATOR CARL T. CURTIS' SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 29

Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)	Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Roman L. Hruska (R-Nebr.)	Vance Hartke (D-Ind.)
William V. Roth, Jr. (R-Del.)	Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)	Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
Glenn Beall, Jr. (R-Md.)	

*Co-sponsors of Representative Edward Derwinski's resolutions 165, 179, 189, 199, 216, 255.

¹ Co-sponsors of Representative Samuel Stratton's resolutions 159, 183.

² Co-sponsors of Representative Frank Annunzio's resolution 250.

LETTER AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES FROM JOSEPH GAILA, PRESIDENT,
LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF THE U.S.A., INC., TO HON.
THOMAS E. MORGAN

LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF THE U.S.A., INC.,
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
Philadelphia, Pa., April 28, 1975.

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
*House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: Americans of Lithuanian descent are greatly disturbed and deeply concerned that, according to persistent press reports, the Secretary of State is inclined to recognize Soviet annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. That would be a drastic reversal of a well established United States policy of non-recognition of forcible incorporation of Baltic countries into the Soviet Union.

The Lithuanian American Community respectfully requests that you support one of several concurrent resolutions presently before the House of Representatives that urges continuation of the present policy of non-recognition of Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries or introduce a similar resolution of your own. We also would greatly appreciate your direct contact with the Secretary of State to express your concern about his policy proposals toward the Baltic question.

The Soviet Union occupied and forcibly annexed Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1940 during a Soviet territorial expansion based on the August 23 and September 28, 1939, infamous secret Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements with Nazi Germany. The United States government strongly condemned Soviet aggression against the Baltic states and refused to recognize this fraudulent and illegal annexation. Since then, succeeding administrations consistently upheld that position toward the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries. The United States government also continues to recognize diplomatic representatives of the last independent governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia accredited to the United States.

The policy of non-recognition of incorporation is of great importance to the Baltic peoples since it provided valuable moral support in their determination to await their national independence. It also sustains and reinforces the Lithuanian people's friendly attitude toward the United States as a great nation that stands for freedom, justice and self-determination. Moreover, it has several important immediate effects. The uncertain international status of these nations discourages a great many Soviet citizens from settling in the Baltic countries. Thus it reduces the flow of colonists and considerably hinders Soviet genocidal policies of colonization, ethnic dilution, Russification and effective absorption of Baltic nations into the Soviet Union.

There are indications that this non-recognition of annexation has also had a restraining effect on Soviet repressive policies since their authorities have to consider the possibility that extreme measures of repression in the Baltic countries might not be regarded as an internal matter of the Soviet Union and could provoke protests in the United Nations and elsewhere.

Although Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are subjected to a protracted oppressive Soviet rule, during all those years since 1940 the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian peoples have never acquiesced to their fate, have never accepted Soviet rule as permanent or legitimate. The Lithuanian people expressed their determination to regain national freedom and independence in an insurrection against the Soviets on June 23, 1941, protracted guerrilla war of 1944-1952 and recently by self-immolations and demonstrations of 1972. In the spring and early summer of 1972 three Lithuanians immolated themselves in protest against Soviet occupation—one of them, a 19-year old student, Romas Kalanta, in front of a building in Kaunas where Lithuania's incorporation into the Soviet Union was proclaimed in 1940. After his funeral large scale demonstrations, strikes and riots erupted in Kaunas. They continued for two days, May 18 and 19, 1972, and the intensity of the riots approached an insurrection until special security troops brought from the Soviet Union suppressed them.

At the present time the national resistance movement in Lithuania continues to grow. Arrests and trials of resistance groups have become frequent events. The main burden of the national struggle is carried forward by the young generation of Lithuanians who were born under Soviet occupation. It is obvious that the Lithuanian people are not reconciled to the loss of their freedom. Those who maintain that reality must be recognized should not forget that although the Soviet rule in the Baltic countries is a fact, persistent resistance against that rule is also an important and pertinent facet of reality. While that resistance continues recognition of annexation would betray those who struggle and suffer for freedom.

In the long run the struggle of the Baltic peoples for their freedom and national independence is not so hopeless as it might appear at first glance. The era of colonialism draws to a close. All great colonial empires have disintegrated. National liberation movements have swept over Asia and Africa. It is unlikely that the worldwide wave of national liberation would stop at the boundaries of the Soviet Union, the last remaining large multinational empire where many diverse nations are being dominated and ruled by the Russians, or rather by a relatively small and aged Russian group that constitutes the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Baltic question is not a dead issue since national liberation movement still is the wave of the future where national oppression persists.

There is no vital Soviet security or economic interest to keep Baltic countries incorporated into the Soviet Union. After German Federal Republic has agreed to respect present *de facto* boundaries with Poland and German Democratic Republic, there is no danger whatsoever to the Soviet Union from that direction. Economically it is in the interest of Baltic countries that the Soviets would continue to use their ports as they have been doing during the Baltic independence period of 1920-1940. It is just the burning desire for territorial aggrandizement that compels the Soviets to hold on to the spoils of their conspiracy with Nazi Germany. In any case, lasting peace and security cannot be based on invasion, occupation and annexation of small countries by any great power. The Soviets themselves solemnly proclaim the principle of inadmissibility of territorial acquisitions by force. They reject any proposed adjustment of Israel's 1967 boundaries as incompatible with that principle. Before these Soviet objections could be seriously considered we should demand that they practice what they preach and first withdraw from Baltic countries.

The Lithuanian Americans are generally in favor of a genuine relaxation of tensions and strengthening of international peace and security. Doubts about détente arise from persistent indications that, in spite of all denials, more than avoidance of dangerous tensions is involved, that the price we are required to pay for détente demands that we avert our eyes from persecutions, violations of elementary human rights and denial of self-determination in the Soviet sphere of domination, that we, in effect, cease upholding our American values beyond the boundaries of our own country. Otherwise why should we legitimize Soviet rule in the Baltic countries? Nobody can seriously contend that the non-recognition of annexation has ever been a threat to peace or a source of dangerous international tensions.

The American position toward the Baltic question is of great and immediate interest to all Eastern European nations, Soviet nationalities and Soviet dissident movement. But also in the world beyond the Soviet domination America's image and influence suffers when her actions cannot be reconciled with her values. When a struggle for freedom, self-determination and national independence is in progress, the United States should not appear to side with the oppressor. Détente should not tilt toward the Soviet wishes so much that it would start sliding into a dismal morass of disastrous appeasement. Instead it seems more appropriate to initiate sustained diplomatic efforts to convince the Government of the Soviet Union that the restitution of national independence to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia would enhance the true interests and security of the Soviet Union itself. It would relieve a dangerous build up of internal tensions inside the Soviet Union, greatly strengthen the trust in policies and intentions of the Soviet government and assist in creating a durable structure of international peace and security in Europe.

Respectfully yours,

LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY
OF THE U.S.A., INC.,
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
JOSEPH GAILA, *President*.

[From the Chicago Tribune, Mar. 15, 1975]

FORD IS URGED TO CUT OUR BALTIC TIES

(By Bill Anderson)

WASHINGTON—President Ford is getting advice to drop United States diplomatic recognition of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.

New developments in this old problem of the Baltic nations swallowed by Soviet armed might in 1939 are these:

Henry Kissinger's State Department and National Security Council are "tilting" toward "legalization" of the annexation by the Soviets in favor of "detente" with the superpower.

Congress leans the other way because of a sensitivity to the feelings of two million Americans who have migrated here from the once-free countries. Already the conflict of views has resulted in the Voice of America suppressing a broadcast about President Ford being sympathetic to the Baltic cause.

The showdown could come this summer at the European Security Council meeting.

Opinion is so strong in the case that some officials in the White House initially tried to conceal from the press a meeting by Ford with supporters of freedom for the Baltic States. After receiving a tip last week, we talked to sources in New York City, Chicago, and Washington, and learned this:

Just before the regular Feb. 27 "congressional hour" at the White House, Rep. Edward J. Derwinski [R., Ill.] submitted a list of nine people he wanted the President to see. Derwinski is chairman of the C.O.P.'s Heritage Division, which deals with ethnic groups.

The National Security Council objected to the visit because all nine proposed guests were proponents of the Baltic freedom cause. It was felt that the highly motivated Baltic supporters would generate publicity and damage "delicate" dealings with Russia.

The last time Baltic activists had a Presidential audience was on Feb. 16, 1962, when they met with President Kennedy. President Nixon would only send an aide to pick up petitions with 75,000 signatures seeking the freedom of Simas Kudirka, the Lithuanian sailor who was taken by the Russians from a U.S. Coast Guard ship.

This time Kissinger's staff lost to Ford's staff, although there was a compromise: The NSC wanted the Baltic group to talk only about "domestic" American matters and to see Ford without advertising the meeting.

A reporter for The Tribune spotted Derwinski's car parked next to the NSC office, with the result that the conference entered the public area. The congressman later issued a press release [which received little attention]. In this statement, the Baltic leaders thanked Ford for adhering to the principle of "nonrecognition" of Soviet absorption of their ancestral homes.

Dr. Kazys Bobelis, national president of the Lithuanian Council and spokesman for the group, also told a broadcast correspondent for the Voice of America that he was "pleased" with Ford's concern over the situation. An NSC call to the Voice killed that program before it could be beamed to Russia.

Ironically, Radio Liberty [partly operated with U.S. tax money] sent the interview to its European transmitters for a Lithuanian-language broadcast.

Further compounding the NSC-State Department problem is the fact that Ford for some time has shown a higher-than-average Presidential interest in the Baltic situation. One person at the meeting was an old friend, Dr. Julius Riekstins, of Grand Rapids, Mich.

"I know firsthand from Julius," Ford told the group, "and I sympathize with the plight of the Baltic people." Dr. Bobelis, of East Dundee, Ill., also reported that Ford asked for the group's help in the fight for his defense budget request—because military power helps the United States to be "strong" in delicate negotiations.

[Our report on this subject will continue Tuesday.]

A MAIL DELUGE OVER THE BALTIC ISSUE

(By Bill Anderson)

WASHINGTON—Americans of Baltic states heritage have united to launch a major campaign designed to stop Henry Kissinger from acknowledging any Soviet claim to Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.

Thousands of letters, telegrams, and phone calls have poured into the White House, State Department, Congress, and to this correspondent to protest potential policy shifts reported in this column March 15 and 18.

The campaign already has produced results. Growing numbers of legislators have joined Rep. Edward J. Derwinski [R., Ill.] in a "sense of Congress" resolution to prohibit the United States from recognizing the Soviet claim to the Baltic states.

And Derwinski, backed by the heavy public support, has called for the State Department to issue a clear-cut statement explaining where it stands. New waves are being stirred to free the Voice of America from restrictions banning broadcasts to the Baltics.

Derwinski, the long-time legislative leader of the freedom lovers, said the public reaction has exceeded that generated by most foreign affairs matters he has dealt with in more than a decade in the House. The well-organized campaign is being led by Dr. Kazys Bobelis of East Dundee, Ill., a physician who conferred with President Ford on Feb. 27.

Attempts were made by Kissinger's staff to suppress news of the Ford-Bobelis meeting. Suppression attempts continue even after the expose in this column. The highly respected Bobelis estimates that the White House has received more than 6,000 letters and telegrams—although the staff there will acknowledge the arrival of only about 1,000.

But samples of our own messages—20 to 30 daily—and those received by congressional leaders indicate that Bobelis is close to the mark. Derwinski is receiving hundreds of communications daily supporting his position.

Additionally, the State Department sent Ambassador Robert McCloskey, its top liaison agent, to confer with Derwinski, the second-ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs committee.

We learn from this meeting that Derwinski told Kissinger's troubleshooter the State Department should cut out its "double talk" on the matter of recognition of Soviet claims. The congressman requested a "clear cut" statement of support of the Baltic states, which are recognized as independent by the U.S. The Soviet military juggernaut seized them at the start of World War II.

If the statement isn't forthcoming following the congressional recess, Derwinski intends to call for hearings to force the policy makers into the open. At the last count, nearly 50 legislators had joined the list of cosponsors of Derwinski's "sense of Congress" resolution.

It was feared that Kissinger planned a quiet action to drop the United States policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet claims to the Baltic states. The intended vehicle for the change is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe planned later this year in Helsinki.

Russia has been pushing for the conferece, altho events in the Middle East and the shaky pursuit of "détente" between the superpowers have put a cloud over it.

The "big view" at the State Department and in the National Security Council is that the Baltic states question is of minor importance—far outweighed by other international strategy. But it is an emotional and personal matter to the two million Americans of Baltic heritage.

A sympathetic Senate source commented: "It is a question of freedom with them, living here and not being able to even help their own families there. The Russians even put heavy taxes on food packages and make communication almost impossible."

FOOTNOTE.—It is our practice to answer all correspondence, but in the Baltic case the volume has exceeded our capacity for individual response.

[From the Chicago Tribune, Apr. 5, 1975]

FORGIVE THEM THEIR HELPLESSNESS

Thirty-five years ago the independence of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia was crushed under the wheels of advancing Soviet tanks. What causes had these little countries given the Soviet giant to ravage them? Only these: They were tiny, they were there, they were coveted by Stalin.

But the independence which was crushed never quite died. It lived on—in fact, flourished—in the memories and dreams of hundreds of thousands of people inside and outside those torn lands. And it lived in the fact that the United States never recognized the Soviet seizure.

Our government had almost forgotten this until someone rediscovered the situation and decided it would be a lovely *détente* "gift" to Moscow to recognize its claims that these freedom-loving lands had become Soviet "republics."

Our columnist Bill Anderson recently disclosed that this wretched proposal was being made to President Ford, and Washington has not been the same since.

From a rolling avalanche of outraged telephone calls, telegrams, and letters, the State Department learned a lesson it perhaps had forgotten or had never known: A nation's independence does not die under the wheels of tanks. It lives so long as freedom remains a burning hope in the hearts of its people.

The Baltic people in the United States cling tightly to that hope.

So, Rep. Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois, a long time friend of oppressed peoples, has called for an inquiry into the proposed sellout and has been joined by 50 colleagues in a resolution to make it the sense of Congress that we continue to recognize these tiny countries' claim to be free.

We hope Mr. Derwinski's efforts succeed. Even in this toughened age of power politics, little countries should be forgiven the "sin" of helplessness.

[From the Chicago Tribune, Mar. 18, 1975]

NEW STRESS OVER THE BALTIC LANDS

(By Bill Anderson)

WASHINGTON—Americans from the Baltic states have found a true, warm-blooded friend in President Ford, but only ice water in the case of Henry Kissinger, secretary of state.

As a result of Kissinger's cold-hearted approach and Ford's compassion, several behind-the-scenes maneuvers have been stirring official Washington. At times this situation has pitted the Ford staff against the Kissinger loyalists.

In the days of President Nixon, the Kissinger staff won more often than it lost. Now the President's long-time interest in the plight of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia has brought at least one dramatic change.

This switch came in the case of Simas Kudirka, the Lithuanian sailor who was beaten and dragged from a United States Coast Guard cutter by Russians in 1970. Kudirka had fled from a Soviet trawler to seek asylum in the United States.

But after being grabbed out of American hands off the New England coast, the 44-year-old sailor was consigned to 10 years in a Siberian concentration camp. State Department protests in the wake of the incident fell on deaf Soviet ears.

President Nixon also failed, in Moscow visits, in efforts to help Kudirka even tho he was armed with petitions bearing the protests of thousands of Americans, most of them from the Midwest. Congressional interest prodded bureaucrats into finding a birth certificate showing that Kudirka's mother was born in Brooklyn.

Still, the Russians kept Kudirka in the concentration camp, even tho he could claim U.S. citizenship by choice.

When Ford became President, we have learned, Kudirka's case was immediately brought to the attention of Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev. The essence of their conversation was this:

Ford—Your good faith in our future talks could be demonstrated with the return to the United States of Kudirka.

Brezhnev—O.K., we'll give him back, but we don't want a lot of boasting and publicity that we have caved in.

Ford privately demonstrated his own good faith by squashing an attempt of Sen. Jacob Javits [R., N.Y.] to use Kudirka as a favorable election tool last year. Javits wanted to claim credit for the release to help his sagging re-election bid,

but other Republicans helped Ford take the sailor out of the New York publicity limelight.

Kudirka is now blending into the American landscape, but the Baltic question reemerged Feb. 27 when Ford saw nine freedom proponents at the White House. We outlined some of the opposition to the visit by the National Security Council, chaired by Kissinger, in a column last Saturday.

Newer developments are that in addition to muzzling the Voice of America from reporting on the visit, the NSC staff even went so far as to try and censor pictures. Photos of a smiling Ford with the Baltic proponents were marked—"Not to be used in publications."

The council also tried to have Rep. Edward J. Derwinski (R., Ill.) reprimanded by the White House Congressional Liaison Office for inviting the ethnic group in to see the President.

The NSC charged Derwinski with "meddling" in foreign affairs, even tho he is the second ranking House Republican in that area and far more experienced than most White House bureaucrats. Like Ford, he has been a leader in the Baltic cause for years.

One State Department source observed that any hope of Russia giving up the Baltic states is about as realistic as "the South rising again." Tho this is a practical assessment, Americans of Baltic ancestry nevertheless don't want the United States to change its policy of "nonrecognition" of the Russian takeover.

We discovered that so much emphasis has been placed on "détente" with Russia that an expert in the diplomatic service had to go to dusty books to confirm that the United States still recognizes Baltic "delegations" here. If Kissinger has his way even this dim candle will be snuffed out by the year's end.

MIDDLE VILLAGE, N. Y., April 27, 1975.

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE—FATAL TO THE BALTIC STATES

(Editorial Commentary)

The recent official reaffirmation of U.S. support for the self-determination of the Baltic States on the surface would appear to be all well and good. In our opinion, however, if the U.S. signs the declaration of "frontier inviolability" at the European Security Conference, this affirmation of non-recognition of the forcible annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, is not worth the paper it is written on. Stipulations from the Western delegations of "peaceful border changes", "self-determination" and respect for "human rights" are nothing but a play with words geared to pacify those who may object to this Yalta-type sell-out. In reality they will be signing away human rights and national aspirations—in short, washing their hands of the whole matter of Soviet occupied territories.

In practice the principle of "frontier inviolability" will be solely interpreted by the Soviet Union, publicizing final victory over its fruits of aggression. Western interpretation will be virtually non-existent. Of what value are such moralistic clauses as "self-determination" and "human rights", when they are beyond enforcement. Let us have no illusions that these principles will receive serious consideration from those who are violating them on a daily basis. The Baltic States self-determined their fate 57 years ago. Are they being allowed to pursue it? Definitely not. The people in the Baltic area have been quite vociferous about violations of human rights. Is anything being done to alleviate their plight? Certainly not. As for the clause referring to "peaceful border changes"—who gave the West the right to set a statute of limitations on self-determination and in this case applying to territories forcibly annexed.

No one expects the Western Allies to begin a war of liberation of Soviet occupied territories. That is beyond the realm of reality. There is, however, no need to put a stamp of approval on Soviet imperialism and declare them the victors of World War II. "Lithuanian World Review Radio" agrees with recent opinion expressed in "The New York Times", the "Daily News" and other newspapers across the country, that under these circumstances the United States should not participate in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. In our opinion this Conference does not serve the interests of the United States nor the Western World.

LITHUANIAN WORLD REVIEW RADIO, N.Y.;
English Language Portion.

ARTICLE FROM THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ENTITLED "YEARS OF WORK INVOLVED IN TRYING TO STABILIZE DÉTENTE IN EUROPE: DECISION POINT NEAR ON 35-NATION SUMMIT TALK" DATED APRIL 30, 1975

(By Eric Bourne, Special correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, Vienna)

A few more weeks should show whether or not there is to be an all-European summit meeting together with the United States and Canada in Helsinki by the end of July.

The Finns need a month to make the necessary arrangements for a 35-nation conference which will attract not only heads of state, but also a thousand diplomats and officials and probably several hundred journalists.

Just a few weeks remain, therefore, to finish work on a document on European security and cooperation which the leaders will debate and endorse. Work on the document has been going on in Geneva for 2½ years.

Both Western and East-bloc diplomats are cautiously forecasting that the remaining snags—some military, others related to East-West exchanges—will be overcome in time.

The agenda's three main areas of discussion—called "baskets"—are in varying stages of completion.

The first, on security itself, has been boiled down to 10 principles of more or less general acceptance, subject to a few final word changes.

Basket one was the Soviet Union's obvious concern, because it will in effect give formal international sanction to Europe's frontiers as drawn by the wartime Western-Soviet alliance at Yalta and Potsdam.

Here, the Soviets have secured essentially what they set out to get. The final argument now is over so-called "confidence-building" provisions in the military field. On these, the Soviets have made one concession, accepting—after long deadlock—the West's proposal for mutual advance notice of troop movements and exercises.

They stipulate, however, that this advance notice should be voluntary and not obligatory. Debate continues over precisely what "voluntarism" means. But both sides say an agreed formula will be found. The Soviets, meanwhile, surprised everyone by coming up with an unprecedented notification of some pending military exercise in Eastern Europe.

The second basket concerns economic and related forms of international cooperation, which, in the period and mood of détente, presented few substantial difficulties.

The third basket has been easily the most strongly disputed section of the draft document. The hope in the West is that it will outline some relaxation of barriers to contact and exchange between peoples. The West proposed this as a primary condition for a European conference.

The acceptance of the U.S.S.R.'s stand on the territorial status quo in Europe seems assured. It remains to be seen just how much, nonetheless, the West will receive in return in the way of freer movement of peoples and ideas between the communist and Western worlds.

It clearly will not be much immediately. But, "some small points"—say Western diplomats—have been gained, though they are but quasi-commitments to no more than normal humanitarian considerations. They cover such things as reuniting divided families (including property rights), family visits (concerning mostly the two Germanys) and East-West marriages.

Modest as these "gains" are, however, they have some significance. It is the first time the East bloc has been willing even to discuss such ordinary human affairs at this negotiation level and, moreover, to agree to put something in writing.

Some relaxation also is possible regarding circulation of non-communist Western newspapers and periodicals in the communist countries. In the later stages of negotiation there was a noticeable abatement of the frenzied East-bloc propaganda about "subversion" by newspapers and other carriers of ideas.

But it will be a long time yet before newsstands in Moscow or on Prague's Wenceslas Square exhibit Western media for sale the way Pravda and other communist periodicals are available daily in Western European capitals.

A Western diplomat associated with the negotiations from the start says: "It is much less than we hoped for. But it is something, and small beginnings have a chance of becoming meaningful. As with other East-West negotiations now in process, it is largely a question of confidence."

That is a widely held Western view. In the East, there seems little concern—except among the dogmatists—that East-West romances or letting a few ordinary East Europeans and Soviets read Western newspapers are going to undermine the status quo.

LETTER FROM HEINO EDERMA, PRESIDENT, THE BALTIMORE ESTONIAN SOCIETY, INC., TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED MAY 6, 1975

Re Subcommittee hearing, 10 a.m., May 6, 1975, on status of Baltic States at CSCE.

HON. DANTE FASCELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

The Baltimore Estonian Society, Inc. submits the following:

Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter, now an integral part of the UN Charter, declares that no territorial changes should occur that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.

The Baltic people have never agreed to the illegal annexation of their countries by the Soviet Union, as clearly stated in the latest memorandum, sent by two underground organizations from Tallinn, Estonia, on December 23, 1974, to the UNO.

It is our understanding, that at the European Security Conference, the United States has tentatively agreed to the principle of the inviolability of borders. Does this apply to the expanded Soviet borders which incorporate the Baltic States into the Soviet Union?

If this is the case, it would be interpreted as granting the Soviet Union title to these territories and, thereby, to the fruits of their aggression. Since the United States has never recognized the illegal annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, it is important that a stipulation be added to the text of the agreement which states that the Baltic States are not considered to be a part of the Soviet Union.

We, therefore, request that this committee pass the Baltic Resolution before it, with a favorable recommendation, to the floor of the House for a vote, so that it can become the sense of Congress that the United States delegation to the European Security Conference not agree to recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, in any way, no matter how ambiguous the wording.

We would also like to point out that nine of the ten principles, tentatively agreed upon by the participants of the European Security Conference, have already been violated by the Soviet Union, in the case of the Baltic States.

HEINO EDERMA, *President.*

LETTER FROM MESSRS. SEREIKA AND PAZEMENAS OF THE LITHUANIAN
VETERANS ASSOCIATION RAMOVE (LOS ANGELES CHAPTER) TO
HON. DANTE B. FASCELL REGARDING SUPPORT FOR THE BALTIC
STATES RESOLUTIONS, DATED MAY 10, 1975

THE LITHUANIAN VETERANS ASSOCIATION RAMOVE,
LOS ANGELES CHAPTER,
Los Angeles, Calif., May 10, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Investigations of the House Select Committee in 1953-1954 established that Soviet Union committed an act of unprovoked aggression by occupying Lithuania and two other Baltic States. The occupied nations now are governed with the strong annihilative tendencies, applying wily migration of different nationalities, russification and a vehement persecution of religion. Moreover, the Soviet Union strives now to get international approval of the final incorporation of Baltic states into the Soviet Union.

United States should not now approve such an injustice. The Lithuanian state was independent for 700 years and in the past had protected other European nations from assaults of tartars. How she should be now extradited to the yoke of communism forever?

We, veterans of the wars of liberation of Lithuania in 1918-1921, now citizens of the U.S., had lost thousands of our comrades dead and wounded on the battlefield. Should our efforts and sacrifices be in vain?

Please, our Dear Mr. Chairman, support and approve House Concurrent Resolution 165 and hereby help to save the Lithuanian nation from annihilation.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS SEREIKA,
Chairman.
CASIMIR PAZEMENAS,
Secretary.

LETTER FROM MESSRS. KARI, GENYS, MEIEROVICS, AND SUMANAS
OF THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE TO HON. DANTE B.
FASCELL, DATED MAY 13, 1975

THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE,
Rockville, Md., May 13, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, House of
Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: During the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, thirty-five heads of state will adopt a declaration that the present boundaries in Europe are inviolable. Thus, after thirty years of the Soviet Union's insistence, recognition will be given to the status quo of the present boundaries of Europe. While such a declaration will not have the force of an international treaty and will not change the de jure status of the Baltic States, the fact that President Gerald Ford and thirty-four other heads of state will sign this declaration means that, without officially stating so, the United States has accepted the illegal incorporation of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union.

Already the signs of this "unofficial" recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States are visible. Earlier this year, the United States Consul in Leningrad, Mr. Joseph V. Nubert, and the Deputy Consul, Mr. Garry L. Mathews, officially visited the Baltic States and met with the top Communist officials in the states. Also, on February 27th, 1975, the National Security Council suppressed a broadcast over the Voice of America concerning the visit of nine Baltic activists with President Ford, so that publicity would not damage delicate negotiations with the Soviet Union.

It is essential that the Baltic States Resolution, co-sponsored by almost one hundred Congressmen and requested by thousands of American citizens, remind our delegation not to compromise, either directly or indirectly, the principle of non-recognition of the illegal incorporation of the Baltic States.

Therefore, we respectfully request that you and the other members of the Subcommittee on International Political, and Military Affairs act favorably on this resolution and allow the full Congress to consider and to go on record regarding the Baltic States Resolution.

Respectfully,

MAIDO KARI,
Chairman, Joint Baltic American Committee.
JOHN GENYS,
Lithuanian American Council, Inc.
GUNARS MEIEROVICS,
American Latvian Association.
EDWARD SUMANAS,
Public Relations Director.

LETTER FROM TALIVALDIS SMITS, CHAIRMAN OF THE WASHINGTON
LATVIAN SOCIETY TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED MAY 15,
1975

WASHINGTON LATVIAN SOCIETY,
May 15, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
*House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: To clarify possible confusion on the meaning of possible statements on the nonchangability of borders to be made by the European Security Conference, brought out in testimony before your subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, it is important that Congress go on record to reaffirm the traditional bipartisan policy of nonrecognition of Soviet forcible annexation of the Baltic States, and urge our delegates to the Conference to do likewise.

Hence the Latvian-Americans in the greater capitol area urge your subcommittee to recommend that Congress pass one of the several Baltic State resolutions (H. Con. Res. 3, 11, 165, etc.) which you are studying. We are concerned that the impression that Congress no longer cares for the plight of downtrodden peoples be quickly dispelled by decisive action on the Baltic Resolution, and similar resolutions upholding principles that we all hold dear.

Respectfully yours,

TALIVALDIS I. SMITS,
Chairman.

LETTER FROM MR. E. KOOL, CHAIRMAN, LEGION OF ESTONIAN
LIBERATION, CONNECTICUT POST, INC., TO HON. DANTE B.
FASCELL, DATED MAY 17, 1975

LEGION OF ESTONIAN LIBERATION,
CONNECTICUT POST, INC.,
Manchester, Conn., May 17, 1975.

Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, Rayburn
House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: Our veterans organization in Connecticut is very much in favor of Senate Concurrent Resolution 29, presented by Senator Curtis. Over 30 years has elapsed already, and there still seems to be no imminent solutions to the Baltic (Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian) dilemma.

Meanwhile the Soviet Russia and her puppet government continue to rule the three countries with severe oppressive tactics, and even hope and plan to gain recognition to such activity at the European Conference on Cooperation and Security.

We respectfully request that you join with the supporters of Senate Con. Res. 29.

Respectfully yours,

E. KOOL, *Chairman.*

ARTICLE FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES ENTITLED, "U.S. EASES POLICY ON BALTIC STATES" BY JAMES F. CLARITY, MAY 18, 1975

LENINGRAD, May 17—The United States through its consulate here, is diluting a 35-year-old policy of refusing to recognize the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet Union.

Western diplomats here feel that there is a gradual but unmistakable American movement toward de facto, if not formal, recognition of the Soviet Baltic republics, which were placed under Moscow's rule in 1940. Since the United States consulate opened here 22 months ago, the diplomats note, American contacts with political, economic and cultural officials in the Baltic republics have significantly increased.

The American consul general, Joseph W. Neuber, said in an interview that United States policy of nonrecognition had not changed. But he acknowledged that in effect he was now the United States Ambassador to the three republics. Since he became consul general eight months ago, Mr. Neuber has visited each of the Baltic capitals—Vilna in Lithuania, Riga in Latvia, and Tallinn in Estonia—which fall within his consular district.

Americans of Baltic origin have expressed concern that the United States is drifting away from its policy of nonrecognition. Acting on their behalf, Representative Edward J. Derwinski, Republican of Illinois, recently received a letter from Kempton B. Jenkins, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, affirming United States policy.

Mr. Neuber adheres to American policy protocol by not making direct contacts with the highest party and government officials in the Baltic republics, but he has met with their deputies.

"I am pleased," Mr. Neuber said, "that these three cities fall within the consular district and that our relations with their officials are developing quite well." The consul general said the Baltic republics were a major part of his job. The consulate, rather than the embassy in Moscow, has responsibility for reporting on the Baltic region to the State Department.

EXCHANGES ARE INCREASING

The American nonrecognition policy, diplomats feel, is also being weakened by increasing Baltic-American contacts in culture and education. A number of American performing groups have visited the Baltic republics.

Preliminary discussions are under way to bring American educators to Baltic universities to teach English. There are no American exchange students now in the Baltic republics, but their arrival is considered likely in the next few years. American tourists may visit the Baltic capitals and there are no special restrictions on American imports of goods produced in the Baltic republics.

American officials are said to feel no strong pressure from Soviet officials for a formal change in United States policy. The Soviet Union, according to diplomats, seems content with the present movement away from strict nonrecognition. Americans are said to doubt that formal recognition will come soon, but they believe that it is inevitable.

The Soviet incorporation, which many Baltic émigrés denounced as a Soviet usurpation, took place after Stalin had signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, it occupied the Baltic states. At the end of the war, Moscow resumed its control.

The Baltic governments in exile still maintain officially recognized missions in Washington. Some diplomats here, noting that the émigré leaders are getting old, feel that pressure against recognition of Soviet control will gradually fade.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY DR. KAZYS BOBELIS, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL, INC., REGARDING CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED MAY 19, 1975

The Lithuanian American Council is a nationwide organization composed of Americans of Lithuanian descent, representing over 1,000,000 American Lithuanians and their national and patriotic organizations in the United States directly and local societies and clubs through its chapters in major cities.

It was formed in 1940, to safeguard American interests, and to work for the restoration of justice and freedom for the people of Lithuania.

We respectfully wish to present to you certain facts and comments on the question of the Baltic States in connection with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

It should never be forgotten that the beginning of the Baltic tragedy goes back to the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the high-handed decision of two greedy dictatorial powers to impose their will on their smaller neighbors.

A secret protocol attached to this so-called Non-Aggression Treaty entered into by the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany on August 23, 1939 divided their spheres of interest in the Baltic States, giving Lithuania to Germany, and Estonia and Latvia to the Soviet Union. Another secret protocol, similarly signed by these two powers one month later, on September 23, 1939, somewhat changed the earlier demarcation line by allotting all three of the Baltic States to the Soviet Union. But the essence of the agreement remained the same: it allowed these two dictatorial powers a free hand to deal as they wished with the smaller nations situated between them.

The events following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact clearly spelled out the intentions of the Soviet Union. Very soon thereafter, by the threat of force, it imposed on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania so-called mutual-assistance pacts, which allowed Soviet military bases on the territories of these independent states. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union still pretended to recognize the independence of the three Baltic countries. However, in June, 1940, Soviet troops in great numbers marched into Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, thus completing full military occupation of the Baltic States.

In line with orders from the Kremlin and the Red Army in full military control of the three prostrate Baltic nations, the Soviet emissaries forced upon the Baltic States new governments to the Soviet Union's liking and staged fake "general elections" of puppet parliaments, which then in turn petitioned admission of the three Baltic countries into the Soviet Union.

A Committee of the United States Congress, after a thorough investigation of the procedure of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, concluded:

"The evidence is overwhelming and conclusive that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly occupied and illegally annexed by the U.S.S.R. Any claims by the U.S.S.R. that the elections conducted in July, 1940, were free and voluntary or that the resolutions adopted by the resulting parliaments petitioning for recognition as Soviet republics were legal are false and without foundation in fact." (Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, Third Interim Report, p. 8, 1954)

The problem of the Baltic States is intimately connected with the liquidation of the consequences of World War II. Since the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe might be regarded in a way as a substitute to a Peace conference at least partly liquidating the consequences of World War II, we are deeply concerned about the fate of the Baltic States.

We are, especially, very much concerned about a declaration of principles that the Conference is expected to adopt which will also include respect for "frontier inviolability", in other words, a solemn promise not to resort to force to alter the existing state frontiers.

However, such declaration reminds us of the Pact of Paris, known as the Kellogg Pact, signed on August 27, 1926, by which the signing parties also solemnly agreed that:

"The settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by peaceful means." (Art. 2)

Practically all countries of the world were parties to this Pact, including the Soviet Union and the Baltic States. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union invaded, occupied and annexed the Baltic States in 1940 and she is still holding them by force. If the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will adopt a principle of respect for "frontier inviolability", this would, in our opinion, entail a recognition of the Soviet aggression against the Baltic States in violation of the Kellogg Pact and other international agreements, unless a specific exception is made thereto in regard to the Baltic States.

Therefore, the Lithuanian American Council respectfully requests that an appendage or a disclaimer be made to said declaration to the effect that this declaration does not contain or imply any change in the United States position of non-recognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet Union and that the American delegation to that Conference be instructed accordingly.

LETTER FROM MR. ALGIMANTAS P. GURECKAS OF THE LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF THE U.S.A., INC., TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED MAY 19, 1975

LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF THE U.S.A., INC.,
May 19, 1975.

Hon. DANTE B. Fascell,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, House Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. FASCELL: Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, has indicated in his statement before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on May 6, 1975, that results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will in no way alter the existing United States position of non-recognition of the 1940 incorporation of the Baltic states in the Soviet Union. The Lithuanian American Community greatly appreciates that statement as well as similar recent assurances by other officials of the Department of State. It is, however, very disturbing that, according to Mr. Hartman, the United States delegation at the conference has no intention to make a formal statement on the the United States position on the Baltic question. We are convinced that such reticence and reluctance to register a disclaimer are undermining the policy of non-recognition of Soviet annexation of the Baltic states. If the Department of State will continue to be silent that policy eventually will become untenable since rights, claims and positions vanish when they are no longer upheld and reaffirmed.

There is sufficient experience in dealings with the Soviets since the World War II to predict with a considerable confidence that they are likely to ignore at least some of the CSCE principles and declarations. In their search for excuses the Soviets are bound to allege that the continued non-recognition of incorporation of the Baltic state in the Soviet Union is incompatible with the CSCE commitments. Then the United States will be forced to restate its position in the most unfavorable defensive manner. This might easily lead to new series of interminable and indecisive mutual accusations and recriminations. Yet such future developments can be easily prevented by a firm and unequivocal formal statement to the CSCE on the United States position on the Baltic question. There is no doubt that the Soviets will frown upon such a disclaimer, but in the long run clarity at the outset will contribute more to a favorable development of Soviet-American relations by preventing future misunderstandings.

With the 1940 occupation and forcible annexation of the Baltic states the Soviet Union has ruthlessly violated all proposed principles of the CSCE first agenda item. It is a cruel joke that the Soviet Union is ready to endorse self-determination of peoples while holding in bondage the Baltic states. The peoples of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia had exercised their right of self-determination in 1918 when they proclaimed independence of their respective countries. In the peace treaties of 1920, Soviet Russia recognized the sovereignty and independence of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia and voluntarily and forever renounced all sovereign rights and claims of Russia over their peoples and territories. The proposed declaration of principles is meaningless if its violations are invariably ignored. The CSCE should have demanded renunciation of the August 23 and September 28, 1939, infamous secret Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements, termination of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries and restoration of their independence in their boundaries of the 1920 peace treaties with the Soviet Russia.

It is obvious that most European countries are too timid and apathetic to raise such questions. But that is no reason for the United States to permit Soviet hypocrisy to dominate the CSCE. A disclaimer on the Baltic states would provide at least some honesty to the conference and its pious declarations of principles. Some other countries that do not recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic countries might yet decide to join such a disclaimer by the United States.

Therefore the Lithuanian American Community strongly urges that the United States delegation at the CSCE be instructed by the United States Government to issue a firm and clear formal statement confirming the United States position of non-recognition of the forcible incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the Soviet Union.

Respectfully yours,

ALGIMANTAS P. GURECKAS,
Special Representative for International Affairs.

LETTER FROM MESSRS. TRALLA AND EELNURME OF THE BALTIC NATIONS COMMITTEE OF DETROIT, INC., TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED MAY 19, 1975, WITH ENCLOSURE OF THE LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; DATED APRIL 17, 1975

THE BALTIC NATIONS COMMITTEE OF DETROIT, INC.,
Oak Park, Mich., May 19, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: By means of this letter we undertake to urge your support and co-sponsorship of the Baltic States Resolution, Congressional Resolution No. 165, which was recently presented to Congress by the Honorable Mr. Edward Derwinski of Illinois.

We would like further to point out to you that the "Voice of America" was prohibited from broadcasting a report about the reception given by President Ford for a Baltic States delegation on February 27, 1975. Neither was our nor the American press permitted to publish the official press photographs! According to information which we have since received, this censorship was enforced by the State Department as a precautionary measure related to "the delicate conversations in the Middle East?" We would like to ask you now to raise investigatory questions in this matter, to determine whether the State Department may permit itself such a violation of the basic rights of free speech and free press?

We respectfully request your active participation, both in supporting Congressional Resolution No. 165 and in posing pertinent questions to the State Department as to its recent policing attempts of our most cherished rights.

On behalf of the Baltic Nations Committee of Detroit, Inc.; we thank you for your support and future concern.

Sincerely yours,

RAIMOND TRALLA,
Chairman.
KALLE EELNURME,
Secretary.

Enclosure:

THE BALTIC NATIONS COMMITTEE OF DETROIT, INC.,
Oak Park, Mich., April 17, 1975.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
*The White House,
Washington, D.C.*

HON. MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the "Baltic Nations Committee of Detroit, Inc.," we extend to you the heartfelt thanks of the former origin of the Baltic States people, now residing in the State of Michigan, for so warmly receiving our delegates from the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian National Committees on February 27, 1975.

We are very much pleased with, and convinced of, your firm stand on the continuing U.S. policy of DE JURE recognition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as independently sovereign States.

Mr. President, we as citizens of the United States of America, firmly support your present policy, and remain,

Respectfully yours,

RAIMOND TRALLA,
Chairman.
KALLE EELNURME,
Secretary.

LETTER FROM MRS. ANNA FALTUS, LIAISON, CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED MAY 20, 1975

CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA,
Washington, D.C., May 20, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. FASCELL: It has come to our attention that your Committee will soon be acting on House Con. Resolution 165 in regard to the Baltic States, which have been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union.

This flagrant violation of the right of self-determination of the peoples concerned has never been recognized by the United States. The Soviet Union is now desperately trying to obtain such recognition at the European Security Conference. We sincerely hope that our country will not extinguish the last hope of the Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians for the restoration of freedom and independence in their countries by giving the Soviet occupation a stamp of legality. The United States is, whether we like it or not, the only beacon of light for oppressed peoples everywhere and cannot be a party to such recognition.

87 members of the U.S. House of Representatives are in favor of affirming once again the right of the Baltic States to independence. Your assistance in reporting the House Con. Resolution 165 out of the Committee favorably so it would come for a vote on the floor of the House, will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

MRS. ANNA FALTUS, *Liaison.*

LETTER FROM V. BALCIUNAS, M.D., CHAIRMAN, AND K. DARBUTAS,
SECRETARY OF THE LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL, INC. (KENOSHA
BRANCH), TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED MAY 31, 1975

LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL, INC.,
Kenosha, Wis., May 31, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: The Lithuanian American Council is disturbed by reports that the State Department has under consideration plans to recognize the occupied countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, to be under U.S.S.R. sovereignty.

Mr. Fascell, we are asking for your support and immense influence within the House of Representatives, to support Concurrent Resolution No. 165 sponsored by Mr. Edward J. Derwinski.

Lithuanian Americans and freedom loving people throughout the world will be grateful for your support and aid in seeing this political tragedy does not occur.

Sincerely,

V. BALCIUNAS, M.D.,
Chairman.
K. DARBUTAS,
Secretary.

LETTER FROM FELIKS GADOMSKI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ASSEMBLY
OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED
JUNE 4, 1975

ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS,
New York, N.Y., June 4, 1975.

Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: For a number of years, the delegates of the Assembly of Captive European Nations were privileged to be received by the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who took interest in foreign affairs. This gave our delegates the opportunity to present to the distinguished legislators of the United States our views on the problems concerning the captive nations in the light of current international developments.

We therefore respectfully request an appointment for an ACEN delegation, from New York City, for Wednesday June 18 in the afternoon, or if more convenient for Thursday June 19, morning or afternoon.

Hoping for a favorable reply to our request, I am,
Sincerely yours,

FELIKS GADOMSKI,
Secretary General.

LETTER FROM JURGIS BREIVE, EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY OF CICERO TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL
DATED JUNE 7, 1975

LITHUANIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY OF CICERO,
Cicero, Ill., June 7, 1975.

HON. DANTE FASCELL,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There are strong indications that the U.S. is diluting its policy of refusing to recognize the forcible conquest of the Baltic States by the Soviet communist.

To strengthen this policy and to help fight for freedom for the enslaved citizens of the Baltic States, I urge you to favorably report the Baltic States Resolution (S. Con. Res. 29).

Sincerely,

JURGIS BREIVE,
Executive Chairman.

LETTER FROM JONAS EIGELIS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN LITHUANIAN
CLUB OF BEVERLY SHORES TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED
JUNE 7, 1975

AMERICAN LITHUANIAN CLUB OF BEVERLY SHORES,
Beverly Shores, Ind., June 7, 1975.

HON. DANTE FASCELL,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: There are strong indications that the U.S. is diluting its policy of refusing to recognize the forcible conquest of Baltic States by the Soviet Union.

To strengthen this policy and to help fight for freedom for the enslaved citizens of the Baltic States, We urge you to favorably report the Baltic States Resolution.

Sincerely,

JONAS EIGELIS, *President.*

LETTER FROM KAZYS JANKUNAS, CHAIRMAN, LITHUANIAN AMERICAN
COMMUNITY, INC. (DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY), TO HON. DANTE B.
FASCELL, DATED JUNE 11, 1975

LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY, INC.,
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,
June 11, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. FASCELL: There are strong indications that the United States are diluting its policy of nonrecognition of the forcible annexation of the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union in 1940.

To strengthen this policy and to help fight for freedom for the enslaved people of the Baltic States, I urge you to favorably report the Baltic States Resolution (Sen. Con. Res. 29).

Sincerely,

KAZYS JANKUNAS, *Chairman.*

LETTER FROM MESSRS. KARI, SUMANAS, GENYS AND MEIEROVICS
OF THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE TO HON. DANTE B.
FASCELL, DATED JUNE 16, 1975, ENCLOSING RESOLUTION ADOPTED
BY THE BALTIC FORUM AT UPSALA COLLEGE IN NEW JERSEY

THE JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN COMMITTEE,
Rockville, Md., June 16, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, House of
Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The enclosed resolution adopted by the Baltic Forum,
which was held at Upsala College in New Jersey June 6-8, 1975, is provided for
your information and positive action.

Please inform us when we can expect action in the Subcommittee on the House
resolution pertaining to the Baltic States and the European Security Conference.

Sincerely,

MAIDO KARI, *Chairman,*
Joint Baltic American Committee.
EDWARD SUMANAS,
Public Relations Director,
Joint Baltic American Committee.
JOHN GENYS,
Lithuanian American Council.
GUNARS MEIEROVICS,
American Latvian Association.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BALTIC FORUM AT UPSALA COLLEGE, EAST
ORANGE, N.J., JUNE 8, 1975

Whereas close to 100 members of the House have introduced resolutions (i.e.
House Concurrent Resolutions 3 and 11) which directs that "the United States
delegation to the European Security Conference should not agree to the recogni-
tion by the European Security Conference of the Soviet Union's annexation of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and it should remain the policy of the United
States not to recognize in any way the annexation of the Baltic nations by the
Soviet Union."

Whereas the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs
has held hearings pertaining to the European Security Conference and the resolu-
tions on the Baltic States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Baltic Forum, held at Upsala College in New Jersey June
6-8, 1975, urges and requests that you make a motion to have the resolutions
acted and voted upon in the Subcommittee, thus giving an opportunity for the
House to act on the resolution and we urge that it be acted upon favorably.

LETTER FROM PETER ATKOCIUNAS, D.D.S., PRESIDENT, CICERO CHAPTER OF LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL INC., TO HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, DATED JUNE 18, 1975

LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL, INC.,
Cicero, Ill., June 18, 1975.

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL,
Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Americans of Lithuanian descent of metropolitan Chicago, at a special meeting held June 8, 1975, commemorated with sorrow the deaths by torture, the massacres and the deportations of their nationals in 1940 and 1941. Also, they remembered that these atrocities, leading to national extermination, were performed by the communists of the Soviet Union, which, following the treaty between Stalin and Hitler, brought its army and large secret police force into Lithuania.

Those present at this meeting were willing to aid the country of their descendants and resolved to remind the President of The United States of America, the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, that the tendency of the Department of State to recognize Lithuania's annexation to the Soviet Union as "status quo" does not have any judicial ground or moral reason; the commerce and cooperation in other fields between the United States and the Soviet Union are inexcusable, because the Soviets do not aid the people of the oppressed countries in the Soviet Union; instead, the commerce and cooperation are being used by the Soviets for greater oppression of the subjugated people and to completely put down their hope for freedom.

Also, the participants of this meeting unanimously agreed to:

(A) ask the President of the United States of America to encourage the U.S. delegation to the European Security and Cooperation Conference that the delegation should (1) not agree to making lawful the annexation of Lithuania, (2) demand the Soviet Union to retreat its armed forces and commissaries from Lithuania and other oppressed countries and (3) demand free elections in those oppressed countries under the supervision of an International Committee, and

(B) ask the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs that positive, undelayed action be attained for the Resolutions/Congr. E. J. Derwinski's Res. 165 and Sen. C. T. Curtis's Res. 29/ concerning the annexation of the Baltic countries to the Soviet Union.

Sincerely yours,

PETER ATKOCIUNAS, D.D.S.,
Chairman of the Meeting and President.

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